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ecutive Life was a health[y] company, rated tops in security
in the industry. . . . Well, we know what happened in the
meantime. The management of Executive Life took a lot of
risks. They invested in things I would never have touched,
they gambled, effectively, with my money. I would have just
as soon as taken it to Las Vegas myself. Meanwhile, nobody
let me know what they were doing. I trusted, perhaps fool-
ishly, the manager of that company, and even worse, I trust-
ed my Government to watch over their actions for me, ex-
pecting them to be mindful of those who abuse their power
over ordinary citizens. No one told me a thing until April 2,
1991....O nApril 11, 11:30 a.m., the State took over Ex-
ecutive Life and stopped all annuity checks. Mine included.
...In o wstand to lose everything.
This testimony by Donn C. Sigerson (U.S. Congress
1991a, pp. 212–13) could have been given by many of the
thousands who invested with what they thought were
healthy, well-regulated insurance companies. In 1991, reg-
ulators took over not only Executive Life of California
and New York but also three other large life insurance
companies.1 All these companies had grown rapidly in the
1980s through the sale of tens of billions of dollars worth
of investment-oriented products. These products, mostly
single premium deferred annuities (SPDAs) and guaran-
teed investment contracts (GICs), differ from what insur-
ancecompanieshavetraditionallyofferedcustomers.They
are sold on the basis of their high ﬁxed rate of return and
have more in common with bank certiﬁcates of deposit
than with other insurance products.
ContrarytowhatDonnSigersonimplies,however,very
few of those who bought these new products from since-
failed insurers will lose everything. Many have lost their
righttowithdrawmoneybeforematuritythroughso-called
policy surrenders, but even in the worst case, as their in-
vestments mature these investors will be treated as general
creditors and will receive a share in their failed company’s
liquidated assets. In fact, many are likely to fare much
better than this, for all 50 states now have state-mandated
guaranty funds to at least partially protect life insurance
customers from the failure of their insurer.
Nonetheless, the experiences of investors like Donn
Sigerson have prompted both Congress and the ﬁnancial
press to examine public policy toward the life insurance
industry. The prevailing view among those in Congress
and the press seems to be that the recent life insurance
failures show that the country needs both stronger regula-
tion of life insurance companies and also stronger, more
uniform government guarantees for those who purchase
either insurance or investment-oriented products from in-
surers.
We believe this prevailing view leads policy in the
wrong direction. As the recent record of deposit insurance
at banks and S&Ls illustrates, stronger guarantees can eas-
ily lead to excessive risk taking. The guarantees allow ag-
gressive insurers to attract a large volume of funds quickly
by promising high rates of return to investors. The protec-
tion offered by government guarantees creates moral haz-
ard: that is, since these investments are insured by a third
party, those who do the investing have no incentive to
care about what is done with their money. Moral hazard
encourages insurers to invest funds in risky ventures, re-
creating the kind of heads-I-win, tails-others-lose situation
associated with guarantees of the deposit liabilities of
banks and S&Ls. Strict regulation can curtail this tenden-
cy, but experience in the insurance as well as in the bank-
ing industry suggests that successful regulation is difficult
to sustain and is costly not only in terms of the actual re-
sources used in regulation but also in the way it can stiﬂe
socially useful innovations.
We think policymakers should consider moving in the
opposite direction. That is, they should consider eliminat-
ing all government guarantees of SPDAs, GICs, and other
investment-oriented insurance products and should con-
sider requiring that insurance companies disclose to their
investment customers the nature of the products they are
buying.
The Changed Nature
of the Insurance Industry
“In 1980 the life insurance industry was 150 years old. In
1990 . . . [it] was ten years old.” This is how Gary Schulte
(1991, p. 88), a Senior Vice President of Executive Life
of California, summarized the impact on the life insurance
industry of the growth in investment-oriented products in
the 1980s. At the beginning of the decade, investment-ori-
ented products were a promising sideline in an industry
whose main product was still insurance against abnormal-
ly early or late death. By the end of the decade, the indus-
try was probably generating over half its annual revenue
from investment-oriented products, which typically fea-
tured high ﬁxed or quasi-ﬁxed rates of return and little or
no insurance aspect.
The products that were the vehicle for this change were
statisticallygroupedwithtraditionalannuities,although,as
we will see, this is a misleading label. In any case, until
the 1970s annuities of all kinds were a relatively small
part of the U.S. life insurance business: the annual total of
premiums paid to U.S. life insurance companies for life
insurance was about six to nine times larger than total
annuity premiums from 1945 to 1970 (American Council
of Life Insurance 1991, p. 34). After 1970, however, in-
come from various annuity products grew rapidly. As the
chart shows, by the late 1980s annuities in total had be-
come the dominant source of income for life insurance
companies. Precise data are not available, but industry
sources suggest that most of this fast-growing annuity cat-
egorynowconsists ofinvestment-oriented products,chief-
ly SPDAs and GICs.
The purchaser of an SPDA typically pays a single pre-
mium up front in return for a promise of something later.
Contrary to what the name implies, however, the some-
thing to be returned later (usually 5 or 10 years later) is
not in any important sense an annuity but is rather a sum
of money equal to the original premium plus interest
earned at the rates speciﬁed in the contract. (See the box
titled “Are SPDAs Insurance?”) In most cases, these inter-
est rates either are ﬁxed or follow a formula that prevents
them from varying as much as short-term interest rates.
That is, the typical SPDA is essentially a long-term, quasi-
ﬁxed-rate certiﬁcate of deposit. Like a certiﬁcate of de-
posit, the SPDA contract also imposes a penalty for early
withdrawal.
GICs lack even the trappings of an insurance contract.
Like SPDAs, they also are essentially certiﬁcates of de-
posit. The guarantee referred to in their name is just the
insurance company’s promise to pay a ﬁxed rate of inter-
est for a speciﬁed period on funds invested at or after the
signing of the contract. After the ﬁrst year the interest rate
adjusts, to some extent, according to a market-based for-mula for each subsequent year until maturity, which is
usually in three to seven years. Unlike SPDAs, however,
GICs are not sold to individual investors. Instead, they are
typically bought by a pension fund on behalf of employ-
ees contributing to a deﬁned-contribution pension plan.
The contract is thus between the insurance company and
the pension fund, not between the insurance company and
the individuals contributing to the pension fund, even
though the pension fund does little more than pass money
between its contributors and the insurance company. GICs
arethereforeknownasunallocatedcontracts,whichmeans
that the liability of the insurance company selling a GIC
is not assigned to speciﬁc individuals. This liability feature
becomes signiﬁcant when insurance companies fail and
policyholders attempt to collect on their state guaranty
funds.
Special factors may partly explain the rapid growth of
SPDAs and GICs in the 1980s. The growth of GICs was
especially strong in the early 1980s. The annual ﬂow of
savings into GICs and other so-called group annuity prod-
ucts rose from next to nothing in 1980 to over $57 billion
in 1986 and to $75 billion in 1990 (American Council of
Life Insurance 1991, p. 35). The especially rapid growth
in the early 1980s was accompanied and probably partly
caused by changes in the laws and regulations governing
pension plans, which purchase GICs for groups of em-
ployees. (See the box titled “Pension Plans and the Rapid
Growth of GICs.”) In the case of SPDAs, the combination
of high marginal tax rates and high nominal interest rates
in the early 1980s may have signiﬁcantly enhanced their
tax advantages. This is probably not the whole story, how-
ever, for the ﬂow of savings into SPDAs and other indi-
vidual annuities doubled—from $26 billion in 1986 to
$54 billion in 1990—even after marginal tax rates and
nominal interest rates fell in the mid 1980s (American
Council of Life Insurance 1991, p. 35).
We believe that another important factor in the growth
of SPDAs and GICs was the public’s perception that these
products were in some sense guaranteed. As discussed be-
low, many states instituted explicit guarantees of life in-
surance policies, including SPDAs and sometimes GICs
as well, in the 1970s. Ad hoc bailouts, such as the one ar-
ranged for investors who bought SPDAs from Baldwin-
United before its 1983 collapse, reinforced the impression
of safety created by the explicit guarantees. When com-
bined with the high yields on SPDAs and GICs, the clear
movement of public policy in the 1970s and early 1980s
toward guaranteeing the safety of those products helped
make them popular.
Whatever its causes, an important implication of the
new preeminence of SPDAs and GICs is that the life in-
surance industry now has the ability to grow very rapidly.
The industry’s growth is no longer constrained by the rel-
atively slow expansion of the total demand for life insur-
ance.Instead,investment-orientedproductsgivetheindus-
try the potential to grow rapidly by attracting savings pre-
viously held in other forms. The industry’s growth also is
no longer constrained by the practice of selling products
through its own agents. Instead, SPDAs and GICs are
now widely sold through brokerage houses as well, mag-
nifying the life insurance industry’s ability to attract sav-
ings previously held in other forms.2 To us, these en-
hanced capabilities for rapid growth underline the impor-
tance of public policy concerning guarantees of SPDAs
and GICs.
The Ambiguous Nature
of Insurance Company Liabilities
InsurancecompaniespromiseholdersofSPDAsand GICs
ﬁxed returns on their investments. However, as we all
know, and as Donn Sigerson learned, there are promises
and there are promises. So what really lies behind the
promises made to holders of SPDAs and GICs? It’s not
easy to answer that question. But in a general sense, two
things back such promises: the claim of the policyholder
on the assets of the company that issued the policy and a
system of explicit and implicit guarantees by both the in-
surance industry and the state guaranty systems. However,
as we now explain, it’s difficult for holders of SPDAs and
GICs to judge the value of their claim on the assets of the
company that issued their policy, and the very existence
of the system of guarantees weakens their incentive to try.
Like bank depositors, holders of claims on insurance
companies get little information about what the insurance
company will do with their money. In contrast, someone
who asks a broker about buying shares in a mutual fund
will receive a prospectus that explains the fund’s basic in-
vestment strategy. The mutual fund investor knows ahead
of time whether his or her savings will be used to buy hog
futures,commercial realestate,U.S. governmentbonds,or
shares traded on the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange. Hold-
ers of claims on insurance companies have no such prior
knowledge. Each of them in effect buys a share in the life
insurance company’s total portfolio of assets. Despite that,
these claim holders have no commitment from the com-
pany on its future investment strategy, beyond the fact that
insurance laws and regulations rule out certain forms of
investment. Within these legal and regulatory boundaries
lies a range of assets with widely varying degrees of risk.
AsDonnSigerson’sexperiencesindicate,theseboundaries
do not seem to prevent life insurers from adopting invest-
ment strategies far riskier than their policyholders realize
or would approve.
Since claims on insurance companies are not explicitly
tied ahead of time to speciﬁc parts of the insurance com-
pany’s portfolio, the safety of these claims depends on the
overall ﬁnancial strength of the life insurance company.
However, as Donn Sigerson also indicates, judging the
strength of life insurance companies is not easy. Several
companies that specialize in the ﬁnancial rating of life
insurers rated Executive Life highly up until little more
than a year before the company failed. The company’s
auditor also gave it a fairly clean report a year before it
failed, and only four months before the company failed an
internal memo by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) declared that the company was
“in no imminent ﬁnancial danger” (U.S. Congress 1991a,
p. 116).3 Furthermore, a survey of state insurance depart-
ments conducted in early 1992 showed that the informa-
tion they give consumers about individual life insurers is
generally unhelpful and often misleading or wrong (U.S.
Congress 1992, pp. 127–32).
Perhaps most unsettling of all is that even accurate in-
formation about an insurer’s ﬁnancial strength may be
useless to a consumer. This stems from insurers’ practice
of transferring books of business. In effect, what this
means is that an insurance company can get out of a con-
tract by substituting a different insurer in its place (Sherrid
1992). A reform movement is gathering steam, but in
most states this is legal even without the prior consent ofthe insured individuals. Their subsequent approval is re-
quired, but it is often held to be implied if they send a
check to the new company or fail to voice opposition to
the transfer. Peter Kerr (1992) of the New York Times
gives the example of an insurance company that decided
to reduce its SPDA business. It “sold” a block of such
policies to another company, which “sold” them to yet an-
other company, and so on. The policies ﬁnally ended up
with a failed insurer. Some policyholders were unaware of
the transfers until they tried to get their money out of the
failed company. The effective implication of this transfer
practice is that an individual policyholder is not investing
in a speciﬁc insurance company but rather in some com-
pany-to-be-named-later, as if all companies should be in-
terchangeable from the consumer’s point of view.4
The notion that consumers should view all life insur-
ance companies as interchangeable, at least with regard to
their ﬁnancial safety, is strongly reinforced by the current
system of government regulation and guarantees of life in-
surance contracts. Not only do all 50 states now have laws
mandating guaranty funds to cover some or all of the obli-
gations of failed insurers, each state also has an insurance
commissioner whose staff is charged with regulating in-
surers doing business in the state. The mere existence of
these regulators contributes to the perception that insur-
ance companies are safe, and that perception is bolstered
by the tendency of state governments and life insurance
companies to arrange ad hoc bailouts to supplement the
protection explicitly offered in advance by the state guar-
anty funds. This explicit and implicit promise that govern-
ment and the life insurance industry will somehow protect
consumers from signiﬁcant ﬁnancial loss increasingly re-
sembles the situation in the banking and S&L industry. In
that industry, deposit insurance has absolved depositors
from almost all responsibility for worrying about the safe-
ty of their investments.
The explicit life insurance safety net now consists of
50 state-mandated life insurance guaranty funds.5 This is
different from the banking industry, where the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is, as its name im-
plies, a federally supported program. State life insurance
guaranty funds are not as old as the FDIC. The oldest
state fund was begun in New York in 1941, only a few
years after the FDIC was created, but for three decades it
was the only life insurance guaranty fund. Then a rash of
insurance company failures in the late 1960s, mainly
among property and casualty insurers, rekindled legisla-
tors’ interest in state guaranty funds. The NAIC responded
by proposing model legislation, and many states gradually
adopted modiﬁed versions of that model legislation. Still,
in 1990 when the major rating services began to express
concern about the ﬁnancial safety of some large life insur-
ers, several states, including California, Colorado, Loui-
siana, and New Jersey, did not have a life insurance guar-
anty fund.
Nor, despite some convergence in recent years, is state
guarantyfund coverageuniform.Most stateshaveadopted
a version of the current NAIC model law, under which
policyholders are covered by the guaranty fund of the
state where they live rather than the guaranty fund of the
state where their insurance company is headquartered
(provided the insurer is licensed to do business in the in-
sured’s state). Versions of an older model law, which re-
versed this rule, are still on the books in a few states, how-
ever. Since coverage is not uniform and since some fail-
ures occurred before all states had enacted guaranty funds,
the issue of which fund, if any, covers a given policyhold-
er can get rather arcane (U.S. GAO 1992b, p. 25). This
lack of uniformity can also be costly for policyholders of
failed insurers. Currently, 15 states follow the NAIC mod-
el law and cover individuals’ annuities up to $100,000 and
death beneﬁts up to $300,000, with a limit of $300,000 on
total guarantees to an individual. In the other 35 states,
limits are higher, lower, or unspeciﬁed, and some states
impose deductibles or copayments (U.S. GAO 1992b, p.
27). California’s recently enacted law, for example, covers
only 80 percent of the funds due to policyholders, up to
the given limits. (See the Appendix for state-by-state in-
formation on guarantees of SPDAs and GICs.)
The biggest differences among state laws governing
life insurance guaranty funds, however, relate to GICs and
similar group or unallocated contracts. In 17 states the
fund laws follow the NAIC model and explicitly cover
GICs, at least to some extent, and in 2 other states, the
courts have ordered GICs covered even though the law is
silent on the issue. In 14 states, neither the guaranty fund
law nor the courts say whether GICs are guaranteed or
not. Puerto Rico and 17 of the states have laws that ex-
plicitly deny coverage to GICs.
Even where GICs are explicitly covered, individuals
will receive varying levels of protection. Recall that GICs
are usually contracts between a life insurance company
and a deﬁned-contribution pension plan. The states that
cover GICs mostly impose a $5 million limit on the total
amount of the guaranty that a given pension plan can re-
ceive, regardless of the number of separate GIC contracts
it holds with the failed company and regardless of the
number of employee contributors or the total amount due
to them. Again, the limit is lower in some states and po-
tentially higher in New Jersey, where the $2 million limit
is per GIC contract rather than per pension plan. Since the
number of employees enrolled, as well as the value of
their claims, will vary signiﬁcantly from one pension plan
to another, the implicit coverage per person or per dollar
invested will also vary signiﬁcantly, even among the plans
in a given state.
Unlike the FDIC, most state guaranty funds do not as-
sess premiums to build up a reserve in anticipation of fu-
ture failures. Instead, when a life insurance company fails,
the state fund assesses the surviving life insurers licensed
to do business in the state to cover the payments due to
policyholders. In most states, the law limits the annual
amount of these assessments to no more than 2 percent of
annual life insurance premium income, although the limit
ranges from 1 percent in some states to 4 percent in oth-
ers. When the volume of claims on the fund exceeds the
legal maximum the fund can assess state insurers per year,
guarantee payments may be stretched out over several
years. When this happens, or when there is a delay in liq-
uidating or restructuring the failed company, even fully
covered individuals may have to wait an extended period
to gain access to their funds. In the aftermath of the fail-
ure of Executive Life, for example, the California guar-
anty fund temporarily cut monthly annuity beneﬁts to 70
percent of their stated value and cut off access to the cash
value of whole-life and SPDA policies by suspending
policyholders’ rights to surrender or borrow against their
policies.
As with FDIC insurance, the ultimate burden of fund-
ing life insurance guaranty funds extends to consumersand taxpayers. For insurers, fund assessments are a full or
partial credit against most states’ taxes. Regulators in
some states also make allowances for fund assessments
when deciding whether to approve a company’s request to
increase insurance premiums (U.S. Congress 1991a, pp.
94–96; 1991d, pp. 75–106).
The state guaranty fund system is not the only potential
safeguard consumers can look to, however. Each state, as
part of its regulatory function, conducts periodic ﬁnancial
examinations of the life insurance companies licensed to
do business within its borders. The purpose of these ex-
ams is, in part, to judge whether the companies are invest-
ing their premium income in accordance with regulatory
guidelines designed to limit their risk of insolvency. To
some extent, the mere fact that each state has this respon-
sibilityencouragesinvestorslikeDonnSigersontoassume
the government is keeping an eye on their insurance com-
pany for them. That is, even without a state guaranty
fund, investors might conclude that if a company passes
their state’s insurance exam it must be safe enough.
The general impression that any insurance company
product is a safe investment also has been fostered by the
willingness of insurance companies and state legislators
and regulators to arrange ad hoc consumer bailouts in
some cases. When Baldwin-United, a major nationwide
supplier of SPDAs, failed in 1983, thousands of policy-
holders had no explicit guaranty fund coverage. Thou-
sands more around the nation were explicitly protected
only by the state guaranty fund of Indiana, which did not
have adequate ﬁnancial resources to pay them all. None-
theless, state regulators and several major life insurance
and brokerage companies reached an agreement that made
many of these individuals whole (or nearly so) while
spreading the costs broadly across the insurance and bro-
kerage industries (NAIC 1985, Fitzgerald 1988). When
Executive Life’s problems became apparent in 1990, the
California legislature quickly passed a bill setting up a life
insurance guaranty fund, and some have suggested that
state regulators may have deliberately refrained from clos-
ing the company until after the fund was up and running.6
In 1991, when the sudden decline of Mutual Beneﬁt of
New Jersey took state regulators by surprise, the legisla-
ture acted to create a state guaranty fund on the very day
the company failed. Later, in support of an arrangement
under which the insurance industry promised to pay off
Mutual Beneﬁt policyholders in full, the New Jersey legis-
lature took up a bill that would make retroactive changes
in the state’s bankruptcy law to favor policyholders (and
thus indirectly their guarantors) relative to the general
creditors of Mutual Beneﬁt (Spiro and Weber 1992, pp.
66–67). In sum, the collective actions of life insurers, reg-
ulators, and state legislators in these and other cases con-
tribute to the impression that the guarantees on life insur-
ance products extend well beyond the explicit limits of the
guaranty fund laws.
Moral Hazard and Its Potential Effects
Gary Schulte (1991, p. 30) gives a curious but revealing
description of the corporate ﬁnancial strategy of the man
he worked for, the head of Executive Life, Fred Carr:
During the four years that Fred took the corporation’s bank
debt from $14.6 million in 1973 to $1.6 million in 1977 and
subsequently $0, he developed his well-publicized aversion
to debt. For a dozen years, until 1988, Fred would lecture in
his annual reports and in other forums on the evils of debt.
He would shout, “We have no debt at First Executive Cor-
poration [the holding company for Executive Life]. No long
term debt. No short-term debt. None.” “No debt” was a cen-
tral theme in his corporate philosophy.
This description is curious because it fails to recognize
that most insurance policies are a kind of credit instrument
and most policyholders are thus creditors. Clearly, Fred
Carr did not hope to build a major insurance company by
avoiding all forms of debt. What Gary Schulte really
means is that Fred Carr sought to avoid debts to those
who would have either imposed restrictions on Executive
Life’s investment strategies or demanded interest rates
commensurate with the risks of its portfolio. The state-
ment is therefore also revealing because it suggests that
Fred Carr did not consider policyholders to be trouble-
some lenders. Apparently they were viewed instead as
docile lenders who would not ask hard questions. Thanks
in part to the system of explicit and implicit guarantees
we’ve described, this view was borne out for many years.
From 1974 to 1990, Fred Carr’s Executive Life compa-
nies were able to raise billions of dollars from hundreds of
thousands of docile lenders like Donn Sigerson—people
whose money was then invested, often without their
knowledge or consent, in risky bonds.
The uncritical lending of policyholders derives from
what insurers themselves call moral hazard. As we men-
tioned earlier, moral hazard refers to the fact that someone
who is insured against the bad consequences of an event
has little incentive to try to prevent that event from occur-
ring. This can be a problem if the event is not an act of
God but is to some extent subject to inﬂuence by the in-
sured. A classic example is if someone’s personal property
is fully insured against theft, they may tend to become
careless about locking the door. In the context of ﬁnancial
intermediaries, moral hazard refers to the fact that credi-
tors who think their investments are guaranteed by some
third party become careless about whom they lend money
to. Like insurance policyholders, they don’t ask hard ques-
tions—about the borrower’s ﬁnancial strength or about
how the borrower is going to use their money—because
they assume the guarantees will compensate them for any
adverse consequences arising from their lack of vigilance.
Executive Life seems to be an example of a company that
took advantage of moral hazard. When trusting, uncritical
policyholders in effect left their ﬁnancial doors unbolted,
Executive Life began to operate like the many banks and
S&Ls that had funded risky investments with money from
insured depositors who also asked no questions.
To clarify the nature of the moral hazard created by
guarantees on SPDAs and GICs, ﬁrst consider what hap-
pens when a ﬁrm tries to issue 10-year bonds in the bond
market. For every dollar of bonds sold, the ﬁrm would
promise to pay back (1+r)10 dollars 10 years later, where
r is the annual rate of interest promised. To back up this
promise, the ﬁrm would have to issue a prospectus. The
prospectus would make additional promises, called cove-
nants. First, the prospectus and its covenants would make
clear what debts would have prior claims on the ﬁrm’s as-
sets if the ﬁrm were unable to pay all its debts, and it
would clarify whether the bondholders’ claims would
come before any claims arising from subsequent borrow-
ing by the ﬁrm. Second, the prospectus would explain
how the ﬁrm’s existing assets are invested, whether theﬁrm plans to reallocate them signiﬁcantly, and how the
proceeds of the bond sale would be invested.
Potentialbondholderswoulddemandsuchaprospectus
because they would know that, despite its promise to pay
back principal and interest, the borrowing ﬁrm’s liability
to bondholders is limited. If the ﬁrm’s investments do not
yield enough to pay back all of its creditors, the ﬁrm is
bankrupt. In bankruptcy, the bondholders and the ﬁrm’s
other creditors would queue up for shares of the bankrupt
ﬁrm’s assets. Debtors whose claims predate the bond issue
described in the prospectus would come before, or be se-
nior to, the bondholders. If the ﬁrm’s assets suffice to sat-
isfy the claims of the preexisting creditors, then it would
be the bondholders’ turn. If their claims can be satisﬁed
from the remaining assets, then the junior creditors who
had lent to the ﬁrm after the bond issue would have ac-
cess to any residual assets. It’s thus to the bondholders’
advantage if the ﬁrm makes investments that are safe in
the sense that they have a high probability of yielding
enough to pay back the bondholders’ principal plus the
stated rate of interest. It’s also to the potential bondbuyers’
advantage if the ﬁrm has a large cushion of conservatively
invested shareholder equity and few debt obligations that
would be equal or senior to the bondholders’ claims in the
event of bankruptcy. If the ﬁrm plans risky investments,
has little shareholder equity invested, or has large equiva-
lent or prior commitments to other debtors, the bondhold-
ers would want a high interest rate to compensate them
for the greater odds that the ﬁrm would not be able to pay
them.
Generally, the commitments the ﬁrm makes to the
bondholders in the prospectus are binding constraints on
its behavior. To see this, consider a simple economy in
which there are only two types of investments, safe and
risky. For every dollar invested, safe investments return
$1.15 in good times and $1.00 in bad times. Suppose that
the odds that times will be good are 80 percent. Then, on
average, safe investments return $1.12 (0.8 × $1.15 + 0.2
× $1.00). Risky investments have the same average return
but greater variance, returning $1.40 in good times but
nothing at all in bad times. Let’s examine the situation
facing a ﬁrm in this economy with $8 of initial equity in-
vested by shareholders, no existing debt, and a prospectus
to sell $100 of 10 percent interest bonds with covenants
stipulating that the bonds and the equity will both be in-
vested in the safe investment and that subsequent debt, if
any, will be junior to the bonds. Under this arrangement,
the bondholders will receive $110 in good times and $108
in bad times ($100 from the return of principal on the
bondholders’ money plus $8 from the investment of
shareholders’ initial equity in the safe asset). The ﬁrm will
make a net proﬁt of $6.20 in good times ($108 × 1.15 –
$110 – $8) and will go bankrupt in bad times. Sharehold-
ers’ net rate of return, or net proﬁt per dollar of equity,
thus will be 77.5 percent in good times and –100 percent
in bad times. This implies that the expected net rate of re-
turn is 42 percent (77.5 × 0.8 – 100 × 0.2).
This analysis of the bondholders’ situation presumes
that the prospectus guarantees that any debt the ﬁrm might
issue later would have a lower priority than the bonds in
the event of bankruptcy. If not, the bondholders stand to
lose. Suppose that after completing the bond issue the
ﬁrm is able to break its commitment, and it ﬁnances an-
other $100 of safe investments by borrowing $100 from
a bank whose claim is made equal to the claims of the
bondholders. Then, the bondholders still receive $110 if
times are good. If times are bad, however, the bondhold-
ers no longer have sole claim on the gross returns on the
investment of the ﬁrm’s $8 of initial equity. They must in-
stead split these returns with the other creditor, for a total
payoff to bondholders of $104 in bad times. By taking on
additional debt of equal priority, the ﬁrm has thus hurt the
bondholders.
The ﬁrm’s own position, and thus its motives for issu-
ing additional debt with equal priority, will depend on the
interest rate it had to offer the bank. Assume for now that
the bank is promised 14 percent interest. Then, in good
times the ﬁrm will make a proﬁt of $7.20 ($208 × 1.15 –
$110 – $114 – $8) for a 90 percent return on equity. In
bad times, as before, the ﬁrm goes bankrupt, implying
again a –100 percent rate of return on equity. Overall,
shareholders’ expected net rate of return rises to 52 per-
cent. In fact, as long as the ﬁrm can promise the bank less
than 15 percent interest, shareholders gain from additional
borrowing.
It turns out that the ﬁrm would be able to get the bank
to agree to less than 15 percent, and thus enhance its share-
holders’ position, if it could make the bank’s debt equal
in priority to the bonds. Under these circumstances the
bank would get $104, the same as the bondholders but
more than if it made the safe investment itself, if times
were bad. The bank would thus be willing to accept some-
thing less than $115, the return on the safe investment, in
good times. However, if the bank’s debt was junior to the
bonds, then the bank would require at least a 15 percent
rate of interest on its loan to the ﬁrm. With junior debt,
the bank gets $98 in bad times ($208 × 1.00 – $110) and
$100 × (1+R), where R is the interest rate on the bank’s
loan, in good times. Since the return in bad times is lower
than the bank would get by making the safe investment it-
self, it would require a return of more than 15 percent in
good times as compensation.
Thus we see that if the ﬁrm could get out of its com-
mitment to make subsequent debtors junior, it could en-
hance its own rate of return while hurting bondholders. In
effect, the ﬁrm would not be paying the full cost of the
additional borrowing but would instead be shifting some
of the cost to the bondholders. Covenants that make sub-
sequent debt junior protect bondholders by making the
ﬁrm face the full cost of its subsequent borrowing. They
are one way that bondholders seek to prevent the ﬁrm
from retroactively lowering the odds that they will receive
their promised returns.
Similarly, the ﬁrm’s commitment to follow a speciﬁc
investmentstrategyalsoprotectsthebondholders.Because
of stockholders’ limited liability, there is again a sense in
which the ﬁrm would like to renege on this commitment.
To see this, use the simple economy described above to
imagine that the ﬁrm can break its commitments by in-
vesting both its borrowed funds and its initial equity in the
risky investment instead of the safe one. Bondholders will
still get $110 in good times but now will get nothing in
bad times, so they are worse off. The ﬁrm, however, now
will make a proﬁt of $41.20 ($108 × 1.15 – $110) in
good times and will still go bankrupt in bad times. Share-
holders’ net rate of return now will be 515 percent in
good times and still –100 percent in bad times, implying
an expected net rate of return of 392 percent. Clearly, the
shareholders are better off. If the bondholders had known
that the ﬁrm was going to pursue this risky strategy, theywould have demanded much higher interest rates or possi-
bly not have lent at all. Breaking its commitment to invest
in the safe asset would thus also allow the ﬁrm to avoid
the full cost of borrowing.
Most important, our example is chosen so that if the
ﬁrm either issues no debt or is forced by its creditors to
commit itself to an investment policy, then it will choose
not to undertake any risky investments. It chooses only
safe investments because the average return on the risky
investments is no higher than on the safe investments. Not
investing in the risky asset is also desirable from society’s
point of view; additional risk without compensation in the
form of a higher average return should not be undertaken.
However, if the commitment to an investment strategy can
be broken, then it is in the interest of the stockholders to
undertake the risky investment. From society’s point of
view, such risky investments are the main cost of the mor-
al hazard created by a guarantee system.
The actual economy is much more complicated than
this simple one, of course, but the essence of the problem
is the same. Limited liability creates a conﬂict of interest
between shareholders and bondholders. Recognizing that
the ﬁrm might want to promise them safe investments and
later undertake risky ones, bondholders require the ﬁrm to
precommit to an investment strategy. Recognizing that the
ﬁrm might wish to dilute the value of existing bondhold-
ers’ claims in the event of bankruptcy, bondholders re-
quire covenants to make subsequent debt junior. Also note
that it is implicit in the bond contract, and taken for grant-
ed by bond market participants, that the issuing ﬁrm can-
not transfer its obligation to repay the bondholders to an-
other ﬁrm without the bondholders’ informed consent. All
these restrictions force the ﬁrm to face the full cost of bor-
rowing and can even place limits on how the ﬁrm invests
its own shareholders’ equity. Borrowing in the bond mar-
ket thus restricts and disciplines the management of a
ﬁrm, and this is one reason why executives like Fred Carr
prefer less demanding creditors than are found in the U.S.
bond market.
As Fred Carr and other life insurance executives dis-
covered, the insurance industry’s aura of safety turned pol-
icyholders into relatively undemanding creditors.7 They
lent their money to companies like Executive Life by buy-
ing bond-like SPDAs and GICs. Yet they did not ask for
prospectuses. In particular, they did not ask the company
to guarantee that subsequent creditors, buying other
SPDAs and GICS, would be made junior, and they exact-
ed no commitments from the company about how their
money would be invested or about how the company’s
other assets would be invested. They did not even ascer-
tain that the company would stand behind its product by
not transferring their policy to another insurer. In short,
they were the docile, trusting lenders aggressive insurers
were looking for.
Moral Hazard at Work
By offering high interest rate SPDAs and GICs, whose
safety was perceived tobe assured by state guarantyfunds,
regulators, and the life insurance industry collectively, Ex-
ecutive Life and several other insurers found that they
could attract billions of dollars from docile creditors.
These insurers, therefore, had a huge incentive to mini-
mize shareholders’ initial equity and to maximize risk in
their portfolio. Only state insurance regulators stood in the
way. Acting on behalf of the uncritical policyholders, the
regulators’ job was to try to make sure that insurers in-
vested somewhat conservatively and maintained minimal
levels of shareholder equity. However, in the rapidly
changing ﬁnancial and regulatory scene of the 1980s, this
task proved difficult for even the best staffed and trained
state insurance departments.
The major insurance companies that failed in 1991 all
engaged in ﬁnancial strategies that put their ability to pay
claims at substantial risk. As did Executive Life, First
Capital and Fidelity Life invested heavily in high-yield,
high-risk corporate debt, commonly known as junk bonds.
Junk bonds comprised over 60 percent of the asset port-
folio at Executive Life and about 40 percent at Fidelity
Bankers and First Capital (U.S. GAO 1991a, p. 5).
Through mortgage lending and direct investment, Mutual
Beneﬁt Life of New Jersey was heavily exposed to risky
commercial real estate ventures. Finally, many companies
in the 1980s, including Executive Life, engaged in com-
plicatedreinsuranceschemeswhichhadtheeffectofmeet-
ing regulatory requirements for equity capital without ac-
tually providing a cushion of safety for the policyholders.
Though smaller in overall scale, the 1991 failures of
Executive Life, First Capital Life, Fidelity Bankers Life,
and Mutual Beneﬁt Life closely parallel the pattern of fail-
ures in the S&L industry in the 1980s. Due to the moral
hazard created by the perception of explicit or implicit
guarantees on deposits and policies, both the S&L and the
life insurance industry had access to vast sums of credit
from uncritical lenders. The regulators of both industries
tried to limit the consequences of this moral hazard but
were unable to prevent aggressive risk taking on a large
scale. In both industries, it was thus only a matter of time
before a wave of insolvencies would cause the uncritical
creditors to look to their real or perceived guarantees for
relief.
The failure of these insurers does not by itself establish
that the vague system of guarantees was responsible for
the failures. Nor, more importantly, does it establish that
the vague system of guarantees led to a substantial misal-
location of real investment toward risky ventures. It is
conceivable that what happened in the 1980s was that
consumers directed their savings through new chan-
nels—SPDAs and GICs—but to the same ultimate invest-
ments—real estate and corporate debt—they would have
sought through other means. We are doubtful that this was
the case mainly because such a view requires that most
policyholders ignored guarantees and were aware of the
kinds of junk bond investments that their investments
were ﬁnancing. We, instead, are rather inclined to believe
that most were like Donn Sigerson. If most were, then the
growth of SPDAs and GICs was accompanied by a shift
toward riskier real investments.
Extending Guarantees and Regulation
As Executive Life and other major insurance companies
active in the SPDA and GIC market crumbled and ﬁnally
fell during 1990–91, the public, the press, and Congress
began to analyze what had gone wrong and what needed
to be done about it. The woes of Donn Sigerson and hun-
dreds of thousands of other policyholders were docu-
mented. Blame was attributed to the current mix of fuzzy
and inconsistent guarantees, ﬁnancial innovations, moral
hazard,and,especially,anovermatchedregulatorysystem.
The unsurprising result was that many proposed solutionsinvolve more complete guarantees for policyholders com-
bined with more effective regulation of insurers.
Congress and the press documented the many gaps and
inconsistencies in the current state-by-state system of life
insurance guaranty funds. We have described some of the
ways these gaps and inconsistencies affected SPDA and
GIC owners and have noted that sometimes the guarantees
are paid out slowly. Experts have also raised the concern
that a few more failures of large life insurers would ex-
haust the life insurance guaranty system funding mecha-
nism (IDS 1990, pp. 38–42; U.S. Congress 1991a, pp. 12,
257).
Severalproposalsaddresstheseproblemsbyattempting
to create a stronger and more uniform guaranty system.
One proposed option is to reduce inconsistencies across
the states by having either the federal government or the
NAIC set clear minimum standards and provide strong in-
centives for states to comply.8 With regard to the inconsis-
tent coverage that can exist even for policyholders within
the same state, there have been suggestions that all insur-
ance products, including GICs, be covered in all states
(U.S. Congress 1991d, pp. 8, 49, 74). To speed up the
payment of guarantees when insurers fail, there are pro-
posals to convert to a trust fund system with prepaid pre-
miums, similar to the FDIC (Spiro and Weber 1992, p.
67). To strengthen the ability of the funds to handle a se-
ries of large failures, proposals have been made for cross-
state pooling or lending of guaranty fund assessments
(U.S. Congress 1991d, p. 5; A. M. Best 1992, p. 134). Fi-
nally, discussion of a possible federal regulatory role (U.S.
Congress 1991c, p. 1; 1991d, p. 1; Wildstrom 1992, p. 49)
has raised the issue of federal backing, either through a
claim on federal tax dollars (IDS 1990, p. 48) or, in the
case of liquidity crises similar to bank runs, through ac-
cess to the Federal Reserve System’s discount window
(U.S. Congress 1991d, p. 1).
We are not the only ones to assert that strengthening
the life insurance guaranty system in these ways would
exacerbate the moral hazard problem that leads insurers
towards risky debt leverage and risky investments. So not
surprisingly, proposals for stronger guarantees are often
coupledwithproposalsforstrongerregulation.Again,pro-
posals have been made that the federal government or the
NAIC set minimum standards for the states (IDS 1990,
pp. 46–47; U.S. Congress 1991a, pp. 106-8; 1991d, p. 5).
These might mandate uniform standards and policies for
the following: the staffing and qualiﬁcation levels of state
insurance regulatory departments; the frequency of insur-
ance company examinations and the type of information
to be collected in the exams; the amounts of the various
types of assets that insurers would be allowed to hold; the
guidelines used to rate the riskiness of those assets; and
the approval of reinsurance arrangements. Some proposals
address the issue of whether state regulators were too slow
to act when life insurers got in ﬁnancial trouble. One sug-
gested reform under these proposals would be uniform
standardsthatwouldmandateearlyregulatoryintervention
to preserve the assets of troubled insurers before they be-
come insolvent (U.S. Congress 1991a, p. 194; 1991c, pp.
9–50; 1991d, p. 1). To directly reduce moral hazard, there
are proposals that either the amount of surplus capital that
a life insurer is required to hold or the amount of the
premium it would pay into a pre-funded guaranty fund
should be directly linked to the riskiness of its investment
portfolio.9 The federal government’s role could involve
aiding the states in the regulation of insurance holding
companies or foreign reinsurance companies (U.S. Con-
gress 1991c, p. 13), and there has also been discussion of
the federal government simply taking over insurance com-
pany regulation from the states (Wildstrom 1992, p. 49).
The combination of more dependable guarantees and
tougher regulation is logically balanced. It recognizes that
more generous guarantees increase moral hazard but at-
tempts to limit the potentially negative consequences of
increased moral hazard by means of tougher regulation of
insurers. In that sense, it avoids the cart before the horse
policy that was applied to the S&L industry in the 1980s,
when increased deposit insurance coverage was combined
with looser regulation (Kareken 1983).
Defects of Extending Guarantees
and Regulation
Despite the logic of combining tighter regulation with any
increase in SPDA or GIC guarantees, the results could
easily be disappointing. On the one hand, regulators might
be able to limit SPDA and GIC interest rates as well as to
channel the premiums into investments that always yield-
ed enough to repay policyholders. The result in this case
would probably be nearly useless products, ones that
merely duplicated the kind of investment options consum-
ers already have. On the other hand, even enhanced pow-
ers might not be enough to help regulators keep up with
the ﬁnancial innovations that insurers would create in their
attempts to circumvent regulation. If insurers stayed one
innovation ahead of regulators, then moral hazard prob-
lems would reappear and again lead to resource misalloca-
tion and ﬁnancial crises.
How might regulators succeed in virtually eliminating
the moral hazard associated with guaranteed SPDAs and
GICs? One way would be to require that SPDA and GIC
premiums be invested very conservatively and that their
interest rates be correspondingly low. Under this alterna-
tive, these investments would not be particularly attractive
or useful to savers, who already can get safe low yields
from government bonds. Another way would be to let the
insurance company offer higher interest rates on SPDAs
and GICs and invest the premiums more aggressively but
then to require the company to maintain a large reserve of
conservatively invested capital. (According to some sug-
gestions, the amount of this capital reserve would depend
on just how aggressively the premiums were invested.)
Underthisalternative,theinsurancecompanywouldprob-
ably not be an attractive investment for shareholders. Ei-
ther way, eliminating moral hazard leads to an unattractive
product that would probably disappear from the market-
place (except to the extent that it might arbitrarily be
granted tax advantages over equally good or inherently su-
perior substitutes).
Note that effective regulation of SPDAs and GICs, in
the process of reducing them to a possibly useless prod-
uct, would also impose costs. As recent congressional tes-
timony clearly implies, effective regulation would require
considerable resources for boosting the number and aver-
age skill level of insurance examiners. Furthermore, as has
been recognized by some regulators (Lennon 1991; U.S.
Congress 1991a, p. 156; 1991c, p. 225), tough regulation
tends not only to prevent abuse but also to stiﬂe legitimate
progress and innovation.
That is not to say that ineffective regulation would be
an improvement, given the moral hazard inherent in in-creased guarantees. And yet, ineffective regulation is a
real possibility. Although there are many talented and
hardworking insurance examiners, the reality is that even
in well-funded insurance departments like New York’s the
average levels of salary and ﬁnancial expertise tend to lag
behind those of the companies they are regulating. Fur-
thermore, the politics of the regulatory process often sub-
verts the efforts of even highly competent regulators. (See
the box titled “The Politics of Regulating Moral Hazard.”)
Thus, even if enhanced regulation initially converted
SPDAs and GICs into plain vanilla products, the regula-
tors would probably lose control eventually and a reincar-
nated Executive Life would arise.
The history of the Baldwin-United (BU) affair and its
aftermath lends plausibility to this scenario. The complex
of insurance companies under the BU umbrella grew rap-
idly in the late 1970s and early 1980s through the sale of
high-yield SPDAs. By 1983, however, BU’s strategy of
ﬁnancingshort-terminvestmentswithlong-termﬁxed-rate
liabilities was undone by a decline in interest rates. The
company was broke and unable to meet its billions of dol-
lars of obligations to its thousands of SPDA policyholders
nationwide.Its collapsestimulatedcongressional hearings,
an ad hoc bailout, and a life insurance industry reform
movement reminiscent of the current movement. Guaran-
tees were expanded, and the NAIC drafted a series of
model laws to plug the regulatory gaps that had allowed
BU to slip through (NAIC 1985). Five years later, in
1988, an insurance industry expert (Fitzgerald 1988, p.
305) concluded his analysis of the BU affair by stating
that “perhaps the lessons learned from this case will guide
regulators in the future in preventing an insurer insolvency
and protecting the public.” By that time, Executive Life
was already far along its new and different route to insol-
vency, and despite some good efforts by the New York
Insurance Department, regulators put up little effective
resistance.
Conclusion
Concern is widely expressed that the insurance industry
today is embarked on the same risky course that 10 or
more years ago led much of the S&L industry to a mas-
sive ﬁnancial collapse (U.S. Congress 1991a, p. 116). Be-
cause of the moral hazard created by guaranteeing invest-
ments in SPDAs and GICs, we share this concern and see
clear parallels between the life insurance industry today
and the S&L industry of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
In the late 1970s, the S&L industry still appeared to
most analysts to be ﬁnancially strong, but the seeds of its
future problems were being sown by policy shifts toward
higher deposit insurance guarantees and looser regulation.
Today, some analysts claim that only a few life insurance
companies are in trouble and that industrywide data show
that on average the life insurance industry remains well
capitalized and conservatively managed (U.S. Congress
1991a, pp. 2–7, 34–66, 86–99). However, guarantees on
life insurance products have created moral hazard, and
current proposals to increase those guarantees would only
increase moral hazard. SPDAs and GICs, like the jumbo
certiﬁcates of deposit of the 1980s, are potent vehicles for
exploiting this moral hazard. So policymakers should not
take too much comfort from evidence that the ﬁnancial
condition of the overall life insurance industry may still be
healthy. Instead, they should adopt strategies for reducing
moral hazard before aggressive competitors take the in-
dustry further down the path of Executive Life, First Capi-
tal, Fidelity Bankers Life, and Mutual Beneﬁt Life.
One such strategy is increased guarantees accompanied
by tougher regulation. However, an obvious alternative
exists which seems not to suffer from the problems of
increased guarantees and regulation noted above. State
and federal governments could make it clear that they nei-
ther insure SPDAs, GICs, and similar investment-oriented
products of life insurance companies nor mandate guaran-
tees funded (nominally, at least) by the life insurance in-
dustry itself. Governments would still enforce criminal
statutes against fraud and embezzlement, but they would
not encourage policyholders to think that some third party
would bail them out if a risky ﬁnancial strategy caused
their insurer to go broke.
One likely effect of this policy change would be that
the insurance industry would discover that SPDAs and
GICs without guarantees simply aren’t viable. In this case,
they would just disappear. Investment in some of the as-
sets that SPDAs and GICs funded, such as junk bonds and
speculative commercial real estate, might also decline. If
so, this would just reﬂect the end of the subsidy to these
investments—and the resulting misallocation of society’s
resources—that was created by the existence of explicit
and implicit guarantees on SPDAs and GICs. Another
likely effect is the increased use of variable policies.
These are mutual fund-type policies for which issues of
safety and guarantees do not arise because such policies
are backed by earmarked assets and not by the general as-
sets of the issuing company.
Would eliminating guarantees on SPDAs and GICs
really work? In fact, we do see some problems in elimi-
nating guarantees on SPDAs and GICs while guarantees
on other life insurance products, such as whole-life poli-
cies, are maintained. The existence of guarantees on these
more traditional products would mean that insurance com-
panies would still have to be examined and regulated un-
der something similar to the existing supervisory system.
As we have argued above, the mere existence of govern-
ment regulation of life insurers can easily lead consumers
to the belief that the government is certifying the ﬁnancial
health of the industry and that consumers can thus invest
in its products—even its nominally unguaranteed prod-
ucts—without worrying about their safety.
The possibility that guaranteeing some life insurance
products would imply guarantees of all insurance prod-
ucts, including SPDAs and GICs, raises another question
that some readers may already have asked themselves:
Doesn’t the logic that argues against guarantees for
SPDAs and GICs apply to all life insurance products, in-
cluding whole-life and term insurance? If guarantees turn
whole-life policyholders into uncritical creditors, couldn’t
a company offer low whole-life premiums, grab a large
share of the market, and then invest its premiums in risky
assets? From a policy standpoint, wouldn’t this manifesta-
tion of moral hazard be as undesirable as a company that
exploits guarantees on SPDAs or GICs? As far as we can
see, the short answer to these questions is yes.
Nonetheless, we feel justiﬁed in singling out SPDAs
and GICs for immediate attention. These products have
few, if any, life insurance characteristics, so we question
why they should come under the umbrella of a guaranty
system originally designed to protect life insurance cus-
tomers. SPDAs and GICs are primarily ordinary invest-
ments sold on the basis of their high yields, not just byinsurance agents but also by brokerage houses. As such,
they can attract enormous amounts of savings very quick-
ly. This fast growth alone makes them a more potent vehi-
cle than traditional life insurance policies for exploiting
moral hazard, and as such they deserve the prompt and
serious attention of policymakers.
Appendix
Are You Covered?
This appendix provides a state-by-state breakdown of the guar-
anty fund coverage referred to in the preceding paper. Coverage
for unallocated annuities in general, and GICs in particular,
ranges from nothing to $5 million in some states. Two states,
Indiana and Minnesota, have been ordered by the courts to
cover GICs. New Jersey is unique in that its limits of coverage
apply to each contract a pension fund holds. With the exception
of Maryland, which has unlimited coverage, all other states that
cover GICs simply have a total per pension fund limit rather
than a per contract limit.
1First Capital Life, Fidelity Bankers Life, and Mutual Beneﬁt Life of New Jersey
were the other large insurers to fail.
2The rapid growth of Executive Life, for example, would have been very unlikely
if the company had been limited to selling whole-life policies by the painstaking route
of building up a ﬁeld network of insurance agents who in turn would have had to con-
vinceindividualsorcompaniesonaone-by-onebasistoswitchtheirwhole-lifepolicies
to Executive Life.
3On these issues, see Senator Bryan’s summary (U.S. Congress 1991a, pp.
113–16), as well as the testimony of John Garamendi (p. 144), Martin D. Weiss (p.
161), Benjamin J. Stein (p. 290). See also the testimony of Richard L. Fogel of the
GAO (U.S. Congress 1991c, pp. 11–15).
4The laws governing transfers of books of business could easily be reformed.
When an insurer wishes to withdraw from part of the insurance market, it must ﬁnd an-
other insurer to take over administration of its existing policies in that market segment.
However, the administration of a policy can be separated from ﬁnal liability for pay-
ment. Thus, any insurer that transfers administration of a book of business to a second
insurer should be legally required to retain residual ﬁnancial liability. That is, it must
honor the claims of the holders of transferred policies in the event that the second
insurer subsequently becomes insolvent.
5Puerto Rico also mandates a fund. At the time we write, the most populous U.S.
jurisdiction without a life insurance guaranty fund is the District of Columbia. These
funds also usually guarantee health insurance policies, since many life insurers also
offer health care coverage.
6See U.S. Congress 1991a, p. 256, and 1991c, pp. 76–77. See also George K.
Bernstein’s (U.S. Congress 1991d, p. 10) prepared testimony on the subject of whether
state guaranty funds encourage regulators to be lax.
7In our discussion of moral hazard we have used examples of hypothetical share-
holder-owned insurers. In such stock companies, as they are sometimes known, the
shareholders are generally viewed as the residual claimants on the ﬁrm: they get what-
ever is left over after all other claims (to workers and creditors, for example) are met.
Many life insurers are instead organized as mutual, or policyholder-owned, companies.
It is less clear in this case whether the residual claimants are the policyholders or the
company’s management. Nonetheless, moral hazard would still arise if SPDAs, for
example, were guaranteed. The policyholders could buy SPDAs with normal, fully
guaranteed interest rates, and then the ﬁrm could make risky investments. The high
expected rates of return associated with this strategy would be split, somehow, between
the policyholders and the management.
8See IDS 1990, p. 47; U.S. Congress 1991b, p. 6; 1991c, pp. 156, 164–66; 1991d,
pp. 5, 48–49, 74; and A. M. Best 1992, p. 134.
9See Lennon 1991, p. 101, and the testimony in U.S. Congress 1991a, pp. 233,
254; 1991d, pp. 7–9. See also Wise 1991, p. 235.
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Single premium deferred annuities (SPDAs) can have a mi-
norlifeinsurancecomponentandgenerallyincludeanoption
to buy an annuity at the maturity date. The life insurance
component consists of a small death beneﬁt payable in the
early years of the contract. The annuity option simply states
that instead of receiving cash in a lump sum on the maturity
of the contract, the policyholder can instead receive ﬁxed
monthly payments until death. Of course, the policyholder
could always take the lump sum payment and use it to buy
an annuity without any help from the company that issued
the SPDA. In what sense, then, is the option insurance?
To answer this question, let’s contrast options to buy life
insurance with options to buy annuities. An option to buy
life insurance on terms ﬁxed in advance, without being sub-
ject to a medical exam when the option is exercised, is
insurance against an individual experiencing an increased
risk of death. Is an option to buy an annuity, without being
subject to a medical exam, insurance against an individual
experiencing a decreased risk of death? It would be, if it
were standard practice to subject people who want to buy
annuities to medical exams and to turn them down if they
were too healthy. Since that seems not to be the practice, the
annuity option in SPDAs is not insurance against the indi-
vidual experiencing a decreased risk of death (that is, an
increased risk of living long).
So what does this option provide? It’s only insurance
against unfavorable changes in the terms at which people in
general can buy annuities—changes which would come
about primarily because of unanticipated declines in long-
term interest rates or, perhaps less importantly, because of
unanticipated increases in average longevity. There may also
be tax advantages to being paid in the form of an annuity as
opposed to being paid in cash. Neither of these aspects of
the annuity option in SPDAs provides traditional annuity in-
surance—namely, insurance for the individual against the
risk of greater than average longevity. That is why we claim
that an SPDA is much more like a typical ﬁnancial instru-
ment than it is like an insurance policy.
The Politics
of Regulating Moral Hazard
The moral hazard that arises from guarantees on the invest-
ment returns offered by life insurers and other intermediaries
shifts the responsibility for evaluating investments from
investors towards regulators. If regulators take this responsi-
bility seriously, they are likely to come into conﬂict with
managers and shareholders of those intermediaries that pur-
sue risky investments. These conﬂicts sometimes spill over
into the political arena. For example, federal regulators who
sought to restrain the risky investment strategies of aggres-
sive S&Ls sometimes found that politicians sympathetic to
the S&L industry would discourage or even block their regu-
latory efforts.
Insurance regulators have had similar problems. At the
state level, regulators’ efforts to limit the junk bond invest-
ments of Executive Life and other life insurance companies
became politicized, in part because the regulators did not
have clear authority to impose junk bond limits and therefore
sought such authority from state legislatures. The following
accounts from New York and California are examples of the
sort of powerful political opposition regulators encountered.
New York
Terence Lennon (1991, p. 100), Assistant Deputy Super-
intendent and Chief Examiner for the New York State Insur-
ance Department, described political reaction to the Depart-
ment’s efforts to limit life insurers’ junk bond holdings this
way:
The early bird does not always get the worm. The ﬁrst year
that ELNY [Executive Life of New York] was up to about
19 percent in junk bonds they were called in and told that
junk bonds were a new investment vehicle and 19 percent
concentration seemed too high. . . . The next year ELNY
increased their junk bond concentration to about 33 percent.
We called ELNY again with concern over the high concen-
tration and were told not to worry. ELNY said they knew
how to manage their ﬁnances and were probably not going
to acquire much more. The following year their concentra-
tion reached the high 40s and we decided not to call them
in, having already heard their presentation.
At that point we began drafting legislation to limit life
insurance companies’ concentration in junk bonds. It was
1986, in the heyday of junk bonds. Drexel Burnham had a
very powerful lobby and the legislators heard something
entirely different from them than they heard from us. When
it was quietly suggested that we do it as a regulation, we
proposed one. Then we were called to a hearing by the Leg-
islature and excoriated for proposing the limitation as a regu-
lation. By the time the regulation was promulgated in 1987,
ELNY had increased its concentration in junk bonds to
about 70 or 75 percent of assets.
California
In his 1991 testimony to Congress, Tom Sutton, Chairman
and CEO of Paciﬁc Mutual Life Insurance and spokesperson
for the American Council of Life Insurance (U.S. Congress
1991a, p. 259), posed the question, “Why was Executive
Life allowed to take the actions which led to its demise?”
The following experience was part of his answer:
Executive Life, together with others in the Milken daisy
chain, had substantial lobbying power in Sacramento. For
example, last year I testiﬁed in favor of a legislative limit on
below-investment grade securities [junk bonds] before the
California assembly insurance and ﬁnance committee. In-
tense lobbying by those opposed to such a limit led to only
4 affirmative votes out of a committee of more than 20.
Could we have done more at the time? Perhaps, but the
combination of ﬁnancial euphoria and political clout would
have made success extremely difficult.
Pension Plans and
the Rapid Growth of GICs
One proximate cause of the rapid growth of GICs was the
rapid growth of deﬁned-contribution pension plans. In these
plans,individualsfundtheirownretirement.Theymakecon-
tributions during their working life, and these are invested in
their name. Upon retirement, individuals draw on the results
of their own investments, whatever they may be. This is in
contrast to the traditional deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plan in
which a company promises ﬁxed future retirement beneﬁts
that are not explicitly linked to the investment results on
intervening contributions to the pension fund.
GICs were tailor-made for deﬁned-contribution pension
plans. By guaranteeing a prespeciﬁed rate of return on all
funds invested during a prespeciﬁed interval, they allowed
pension fund managers to offer one ﬁxed rate of interest onall employee contributions received during the prespeciﬁed
interval. Thus the pension manager could, for example, give
employees simple statements like “the interest rate on the
ﬁxed income option in your 401(k) plan this year will be 9
percent.” Such statements were also attractive tothe employ-
ees. Within a short time, GICs accounted for between a
quarter and a third of all funds in employer-sponsored de-
ﬁned-contributionpensionplans(U.S.Congress1992,p.46).
Given that GICs are closely linked to deﬁned-contribu-
tion pension plans, a deeper analysis of the growth of GICs
must also consider why deﬁned-contribution pension plans
expanded rapidly in the 1980s. Prominent among the factors
cited for their expansion are delayed effects of the Employee
Retirement Income and Securities Act (ERISA) of 1974 and
the laws and regulations that brought 401(k) plans into exis-
tence in 1981 (Ippolito 1992).





Jurisdiction Scope of Coverage SPDAs GICs Jurisdiction Scope of Coverage SPDAs GICs
NAIC model law Residents only $100,000 $5,000,000 Nebraska Residents only $100,000 0*
Alabama All policyholders 300,000 0* Nevada Residents only 100,000 0
Alaska Residents only 100,000 5,000,000 New Hampshire All policyholders 300,000 0*
Arizona Residents only 100,000 0* New Jersey Residents only 500,000 $2,000,000
Arkansas Residents only 100,000 1,000,000 New Mexico All policyholders 300,000 0*
California Residents only 100,000 0 New York Residents only 500,000 1,000,000
Colorado Residents only 100,000 0 North Carolina Residents only 300,000 not specified
Connecticut Residents only 100,000 5,000,000 North Dakota Residents only 100,000 5,000,000
Delaware Residents only 100,000 1,000,000 Ohio Residents only 100,000 1,000,000
Florida Residents only 300,000 0 Oklahoma Residents only 300,000 0
Georgia Residents only 300,000 5,000,000 Oregon Residents only 100,000 0
Hawaii Residents only 100,000 0 Pennsylvania All policyholders 300,000 0*
Idaho Residents only 300,000 0 Rhode Island Residents only 100,000 0*
Illinois Residents only 100,000 5,000,000 South Carolina All policyholders 300,000 0*
Indiana Residents only 300,000 —** South Dakota Residents only 100,000 0
Iowa Residents only 300,000 1,000,000 Tennessee Residents only 100,000 0†
Kansas Residents only 100,000 0 Texas Residents only 100,000 5,000,000
Kentucky Residents only 100,000 0 Utah Residents only 100,000 5,000,000
Louisiana Residents only 100,000 0† Vermont All policyholders 300,000 0*
Maine Residents only 300,000 0* Virginia Residents only 300,000 0‡
Maryland Residents only no limit no limit* Washington Residents only 500,000 5,000,000
Massachusetts Residents only 100,000 0 West Virginia Residents only 300,000 0*
Michigan Residents only 100,000 5,000,000 Wisconsin Residents only 300,000 0*
Minnesota Residents only 300,000 —** Wyoming Residents only 100,000 0
Mississippi Residents only 100,000 5,000,000 District of Columbia None 0 0
Missouri Residents only 100,000 0 Puerto Rico Residents only 300,000 0
Montana Residents only 300,000 0*
*Guaranty fund law neither includes nor excludes GICs.
**Guaranty fund coverage was ordered by court decision.
†According to the NAIC, GICs are covered only if they qualify under provisions of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA).
‡According to the NAIC, GICs are not covered except for amounts guaranteed to individual insurers.
Source: U.S. GAO 1992, pp. 42–45, with updates from NOLGHA 1992